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JUDICIAL PROTECTION FOR THE CONSUMER:
VASQUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
In Vasquez v. Superior Court1 California's requirements for a

class action were substantially eased, making the state's position among
the most liberal in the nation.2 The supreme court, under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure section 382,3 allowed for the first
time a class action in a consumer fraud case, thus placing California
in substantial agreement with federal decisions under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 4
The court considered the effect of the recently enacted Consumers Legal Remedies Act,5 intended to allow individual and class actions
for consumer fraud, on the Vasquez decision. 6 Although the court's

resolution of this crucial issue is unclear, it is reasonable to conclude
1. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
2. Of the other states, only a twenty year old Illinois decision seems to have
allowed a consumer class action for fraud. See Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 Ill. App.
483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951). Many states, on the other hand, have rejected such a
class action. See, e.g., Spear v. H.V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923);
Freeman v. State-Wide Carpet Distribs., Inc., 365 Mich. 313, 112 N.W.2d 439 (1961);
Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281
(1970); Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603
(1949).
3. CAL. CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 382 (West 1954), as amended, Cal. Stat. 1971, ch.
244, § 12, at 406 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.). The text of the section dealing with the
class action was not altered by the amendment. The relevant portion of the section
may be found in the text accompanying note 36 infra.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See note 76 infra for a discussion of the federal cases
concerning class actions based on fraud. In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the
Supreme Court interpreted rule 23 to prohibit the aggregation of claims to reach the
$10,000 minimum amount, effectively prohibiting consumer fraud class actions even if
the other jurisdictional requirements are met. Although federal class actions may no
longer be brought under this ruling in the average consumer fraud case, past decisions
under rule 23 are helpful as regards current guidelines in the state courts. Snyder did
not prohibit all federal class actions, however, and such actions may still be brought in
such instances as the redress of racial discrimination, securities fraud cases, or other
federal question cases where no amount is required. See 2 C. WRIGHT, LAW Op FEIERAL CouRTS § 72, at 315-17 (2d ed. 1970).
5.

CAL. CIV. CoDB

§§ 1750-56, 1760-61, 1770, 1780-84 (West. Supp. 1971)

(originally enacted as Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1550, § 1, at 3157). During the same
session of the California legislature the Consumer Credit Reporting Act, comprising
California Civil Code §§ 1750-57, was enacted. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1348, at 2512-14.
References in this note to the California Civil Code are exclusively to the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act.
6. See notes 78-108 and accompanying text infra.
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that the court has restricted the application of the act in consumer
class actions in such a way as to protect the liberalized guidelines set
forth in Vasquez from the limitations of the act. 7
Also significant in Vasquez is that for the first time in California
a court held that a contract could be rescinded against a finance company assignee who had only constructive notice of the seller's fraud.
The decision extends the application in California of the "close connection" rule which holds the financier accountable for the actions of
the seller if they have had sufficient and continuing contact.8 Although
constructive notice has previously been applied to prevent the collection
of finance charges under an installment contract, rescission of the
entire contract had not previously been allowed.'
This note will explore certain aspects of the Vasquez decision and
their relation to consumer fraud class actions generally. First, the liberalized class action rules set forth by the court will be discussed. 10
This will be followed by an analysis of the effect of the new Consumers Legal Remedies Act on the Vasquez opinion." The third aspect
of the opinion to be examined will be the approval of the remedy of rescission of contracts against assignee finance companies in consumer
fraud cases where a constructive "close connection" is proved between
the finance company and the original seller. 12
Vasquez and the Class Action
The plaintiffs, who eventually numbered thirty-seven, were residents of San Joaquin and Stanislaus Counties. They sought rescission
in the superior court of San Joaquin County of food and freezer purchase agreements entered into with a food processor. Separate contract documents were executed for the freezers and the long-term food
packages when the purchase agreements were entered into with the food
processor. These contracts were then assigned by the processor to
three finance companies; the food processor and the three finance companies were named as defendants in the class action brought on the
contracts.' 3
The first cause of action alleged a class action for fraud, contend7. See notes 98-101 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 109-49 and accompanying text in!ra.
9. See notes 115-23 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 13-77 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 78-108 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 109-49 and accompanying text infra.
13. This note will, for reasons of clarity, follow the pattern of Justice Mosk's
opinion, and refer to "defendants" who are real parties in interest in the trial courtthe finance companies-as defendants. "Plaintiffs" will designate both named plaintiffs and anonymous class members, both of whom seem to total about 200.
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ing that the costs of the food and freezer were grossly inflated. The
trial court upheld the defendant's demurrer to the class action aspect
of the fraud count on the basis that class actions for fraud could not
be maintained by consumers. 14 A second cause of action alleged a class
action for rescission of the contracts on the grounds that the food
processor required separate documents in each transaction, thereby
violating the Unruh Act;15 the trial court overruled the demurrers of the
defendants as to this cause of action.' 6 The case came before the
court when the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate to compel the trial
them to proceed to try the cause of action for fraud as a
court to allow
17
class action.
The defendants contended that mandate was inappropriate because the plaintiffs had adequate remedies available to them through
appeal. The court met this contention by pointing out that "piecemeal" disposition of a case was contrary to previous California decisions.' 8 Moreover, when all the causes of action in the complaint have
a single object, as they did in Vasquez, no appeal may be taken from
a dismissal of one count only because the holding was not a final
judgment.' 9 Since an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment,20 the court considered the plaintiffs petition for a writ of mandate appropriate.21
The class action allows a representative suit by one or more individuals afflicted by a similar complaint, but too many in number to
feasibly be united in a single action. 22 Typically, the class injured has
suffered small individual losses, and separate actions would be unfeasible because of the costs of bringing the suit.28 Class actions are
also valuable because they may eliminate injustices eventuated by the
inability of governmental authorities to control the numerous instances
14. 4 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 484 P.2d at 967, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
15. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1801-12.9 (West Supp. 1971) (governing retail installment sales contracts). Section 1803.2 of the Civil Code requires a single document.
16. 4 Cal. 3d at 806, 484 P.2d at 967, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 697, 701, 128 P.2d
357, 360 (1942); Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal. 2d 617, 55 P.2d 1174 (1936). A writ of
mandate may be issued by an appellate court directing action to be taken, or disposition
to be made of a case, by an inferior court. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085 (West 1955).
19. Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal. 2d 617, 618, 55 P.2d 1174, 1175 (1936).
20.

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 904.1 (West Supp. 1971).

21. 4 Cal. 3d at 807, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
22. In California, the class action is statutorily authorized by CAL. CODE CiV.
PRoc. § 382 (West 1954). See text accompanying note 36 infra for the text of the
section.
23. See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684 (1941); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L.
REV. 211-50, 407-513 (1969).
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of consumer fraud,2 4 and judicial efficiency is promoted due to the
fact that the judgment is res judicata as to all members of the class,
thereby avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits. -5
The binding effect of the class action, however, is a two-edged
sword. Absent class members represented in the lawsuit may be unintentionally harmed either by inept representation or, as has happened,
by collusive agreements between the opponent and the in-court representative on the class.26 Such possibilities of abuse or inequity have led
the court in past decisions 27 to establish certain requirements before a
class action may be brought under Code of Civil Procedure section
382.28 First, "there must be an ascertainable class, ' 29 and second, "there
must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law
and fact affecting the parties to be represented. 3 °
The standard to be met in determining the ascertainable class requirement has been liberally construed in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.3 1
where the court allowed a class action by taxicab patrons who had
been systematically overcharged-a class without independent significance. 3 2 In Daar some of the passengers had script books which recorded their travels, but the court did not limit the class to this group.
Instead, the class was also extended to those patrons who rode Yellow
Cabs on limited occasions, provided only that they could establish their
presence to the satisfaction of the trial court. Daar thus weakened the
33
necessity for a clearly ascertainable class.
24. See 4 Cal. 3d at 817 n.14, 484 P.2d at 974 n.14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 806 n.14.
25. See, e.g., Chance v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 288, 373 P.2d 849, 857,
23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1962) (dictum).
26. An example of such agreement may be found in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32 (1940). In Hansberry, however, the collusion was so extreme that the Supreme
Court reversed the Illinois court and found no res judicata effect, since to allow it
would have violated the due process clause.
27. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1967); Slakey Bros. Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal. App. 2d 204,
71 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1968).
28. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 382 (West 1954).
29. E.g. Chance v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 290, 373 P.2d 849, 858,
23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 770 (1962); Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32
Cal. 2d 833, 842-43, 198 P.2d 514, 520 (1948).
30. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704, 433 P.2d 732, 739, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 731 (1967); Chance v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 286, 373 P.2d 849,
855, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1962); Slakey Bros. Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal.
App. 2d 204, 207, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (1968).
31. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
32. Id. at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
33. "[W]hether there is an ascertainable class depends in turn upon the community of interest among the class members in the questions of law and fact involved."
Id.; accord, Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 912, 442 P.2d 692, 728, 69 Cal. Rptr.
612, 648 (1968). For an argument that the ascertainable class requirement has fully
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The court did not even discuss the "ascertainable class" issue in
Vasquez, except to state that there was no problem in this regard, since
the members on the class would be readily identifiable through the defendant's business records coupled with the fact that they would be residents of Stanislaus and San Joaquin counties. 4 Although the Vasquez decision continued to make the distinction between the "ascertainable class" and "community of interest" requirements, it now seems
clear that they have become closely entwined in California.3 5
The key question in a class action under section 382, then, is
whether there is the requisite community of interest among the members of the class. Section 382, which formed the basis for the class action in Vasquez, provides:
[A]nd when the question is one of a common or general interest,
of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the Court, one or more may
36
sue or defend for the benefit of all.
37
Prior to Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Association
the "community of interest" requirement was satisfied only where the potential class in question was so similar in interest as to be wholly comprised of "necessary parties"-identified parties who could have
brought suit on their own behalf.3 s In Weaver a class action was
brought on behalf of individuals who waited in line after being promised tickets to the Rose Bowl but were unable to purchase them because the tickets had been distributed elsewhere. Weaver liberalized
the class action requirements by throwing out the "necessary party" limitation, holding that to limit class actions to necessary parties would
emasculate section 382. The decision held, however, that since the
causes of action of the several plaintiffs were separate and distinct, a
decision favorable or adverse to any of the named plaintiffs could not
merged with the community of interest requirement see The Supreme Court of California, 1967-1968, 56 CALIF. L. Rv. 1612, 1641 (1968), which states: "Daar thus
pushes this emasculation of the supposedly independent ascertainable class requirement
to its conclusion by explicitly rejecting the notion that the members of the class must
be known or identifiable at the time the suit is brought."
34. 4 Cal. 3d at 811, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
35. Though the requirement of an "ascertainable class" has been weakened by
Daar, see note 33 supra, the existence of the class must always be established. This
would, however, generally be accomplished as a result of the "community of interest"
allegations. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706, 433 P.2d 732, 740, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 732 (1967).
36. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 382 (West 1954) (emphasis added).
37. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
38. Carey v. Brown, 58 Cal. 180, 183-84 (1881); Watson v. Santa Carmelita
Mut. Water Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 718, 137 P.2d 757, 762 (1943). See Ballin v. Los
Angeles County Fair, 43 Cal. App. 2d 884, 887, 111 P.2d 753, 756 (1941); Goodspeed
v. Great W. Power Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 435, 444, 65 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1937).
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determine the rights of the absent members of the class, and the class
action was denied.3 9
The impact of the Weaver decision was unclear. The court cited
so many items of proof as being "individual" in nature 40 that at least
one writer has contended that the elimination of the necessary party
requirement was counteracted by the obscure reasoning presented by
the court.41 In effect, the requirements for a class action remained
muddled.
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.4 2 markedly clarified the confusion, and
posited two other criteria for deciding whether a class action was appropriate. First, the court had to decide whether or not each person's
right to recover was separate and distinct from that of his fellow class
members. 43 If the issues were not separate and distinct, then the court
would also have to balance the importance of hearing the issues in a
large number of individual suits with the appropriateness of adjudication in a single class action. 44 Daar did not require that all issues be
resolvable in the class action. It is sufficient, under the Daar holding,
that there are sufficiently important "common questions" to justify a
class action,"5 and the class action will only be res judicata as to the
common questions decided. 4 6
Although Daar did not involve fraudulent misrepresentations,
Vasquez held that Daar's principles were controlling in determining
whether the class action was "an appropriate vehicle to resolve a claim
based upon such misrepresentations."4 7 Vasquez also employed Daar's
discussion of previous California decisions-notably Weaver-to dis8
tinguish the "markedly dissimilar" facts of those cases.
The court specifically discussed the case of Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker49 in which creditors of an insolvent subdivider
had brought a class action alleging that the defendant had concealed
the subdivider's financial difficulties. In that case, the class action was
39. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 838-43, 198 P.2d 514, 517-20 (1948), noted in 37 CALIF. L
REv. 525, 528 (1949).
40. Weaver held that each plaintiff, individually, would have to establish that he
stood in line, had a receipt stub for the promised tickets, tendered the price of admission, was of sober character, and had been denied the tickets to which he was rightfully
entitled. 32 Cal. 2d at 839, 198 P.2d at 517.
41. Note, Class Actions and Interpleader, 6 STAN. L. REv. 120, 132-33 (1953).
42. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
43. Id. at 713, 433 P.2d at 745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 704, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
47. 4 Cal. 3d at 809, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
48. Id. at 819, 484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
49. 265 Cal. App. 2d 204, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1968).
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denied on the basis that there could be no community of interest due to
the fact that the representations to creditors had been made in so many
different ways," ° and on these grounds, Slakey Brothers was distinguished in Vasquez. 51
Actions for consumer fraud are of course brought against the
background of the ordinary commercial sales transaction. In this sort
of business dealing, it is inevitable that each sale is an individual transaction, conducted with different customers on different days, often with
merchandise differing in many aspects from sale to sale. Each customer also makes a purchase as a result of an individual motivation, and
may have relied on separate portions of the sales representation. As
such, these transactions have in the past been labeled "separate and
distinct," resulting in a lack of the requisite community of interest
among the defrauded consumers. 52
Plaintiffs in Vasquez seized on the matter of the representations
which had been made to the consumer as the entering wedge and alleged that common misrepresentations had been made to consumers
by the food processor in that the freezers and food packages were
sold by salesmen who were reciting by rote from a memorized sales
manual.53 The representations made to each customer were thus essentially the same. Since the plaintiffs alleged fraud, the court dis54
cussed the matter of community of interest in that frame of reference,
noting the requisite elements in establishing fraud: a false representation made with knowledge of its falsity and with the requisite intent
that it be relied upon and reasonable reliance in fact upon the representation with resulting damages.5 5
Defendants argued that each case was so distinct that no class action could legitimately resolve the issue. For example, the food packages were purported to last seven months. Therefore, argued the de50. In Slakey Bros. the class members were relatively well-to-do businessmen with,
presumably, adequate resources to finance litigation. The claims in that case ranged up
to $81,840. Furthermore, misrepresentations were made to the alleged class as a
group, some to public officers, and still others to only portions of the group. The
Vasquez decision notes that "[t]he alleged misrepresentations were in form and mode
of communication so varied as to 'exhaust the legal possibilities."' 4 Cal. 3d at 819,
484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
51. 4 Cal. 3d at 819, 484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
52. For a general discussion of these reasons, and a statement that class suits
for rescission of contracts are unlikely, see Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1015, 1016 (1938).
Vasquez specifically repudiated the "33-year-old categorical pronouncement" of the
A.L.R. by allowing the class action. 4 Cal. 3d at 820 n.17, 484 P.2d at 977 n.17,
94 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.17.
53. 4 Cal. 3d at 811-12, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
54. Id. at 811-15, 484 P.2d at 970-74, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802-06.
55.

Ach v. Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477

(1968); Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 68, 306 P.2d 1017, 1025 (1957).
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fendants, until each plaintiff testified as to their individual rate of food
consumption, resolution of this issue was impossible.5 6 Since individual testimony would clearly be required in this matter, acceptance of
this argument by the court would have effectively precluded the class
action.
The court found this argument unpersuasive at the pleading stage
because the denial of a class action in such a situation would presuppose that plaintiffs could not establish their allegations without the testimony of the individual class members.57 Rather, the court noted that
on demurrer the allegation that the representations were the same must
be accepted as true,5 8 even though it was clear that separate individual
transactions took place. 9 In an extremely significant step, the court
thus held that common representation claims must, at the pleading
level, be afforded the opportunity to show a common basis.
If plaintiffs can prove their allegations at the trial, an inference
that the representations were made to each class member would
arise, in which case it would be unnecessary to elicit the testimony of each plaintiff as to whether the representations were in
fact made to him. 60
This, in effect, makes a crucial practical alteration in the burden of proof at trial heretofore not present in the decisions. The absent class member now need only demonstrate that he is a member of
the particular class, and there is no need for specific testimony as to
whether the elements which initially led to class liability apply to him."t
Once the class representative has proven the elements of fraud as to
himself, together with a common representation, these elements in turn
determine that the fraud applies to the class as a whole.
56. 4 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 484 P.2d at 971-72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 812, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
59. In spite of the fact that individual consumers might have different specifications of their food desires, the court found that the existence of ready-made food
"packs" lent further credence to the plaintiffs' allegation of common representations.
Id. at 813, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
60. Id. at 812, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
61. Assuming that the common representations have been established, however,
it seems likely that abolishing the requirement of specific testimony will result in no
alteration in the eventual outcome of the case. This is so because the nature of the
representations in this sort of case is so extreme as to create virtual certainty that
fraud, in fact, did exist. Taking the freezer representations as an example, similar
cases in other jurisdictions have almost universally found that fraud was present. See
Toker v. Per], 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), afI'd 108 N.J.
Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d
189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969). These cases were decided under the mandate
of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, which has not been adopted in California.
However, State Finance v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941), seems to
have arrived at the same result without regard to the unconscionability element.
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The "common representation," then, was the keystone upon which
the community of interest requirement was satisfied in Vasquez. Not
only must the plaintiffs be afforded the opportunity to show a common representation, but once its existence has been shown, the inference is that the absent class members also relied upon the same repre2
sentation.
As in Daar, 3 the court pointed out that community of interest
does not depend on an identical recovery on behalf of all class members. 64 This is a sound move, and further erodes the restrictive doctrine previously espoused in Weaver.
In discussing the reliance issue, the court cited a series of California cases which held that it was not necessary to show reliance on
false representations by direct evidence.6" California decisions have
held that an inference of reliance on false representations may be established in certain cases. 66 The court also considered the positions of
Williston17 and the Restatement of Contracts,"8 which maintain that a
presumption of reliance should be established in like circumstances.
In the end, however, the court established an inference, and declined
the opportunity to establish a presumption in favor of the consumer,

since it was not deemed necessary to uphold the ultimate decision in the
case.69 In a situation similar to Vasquez, however, an inference at the

trial court is almost certain to be sufficient in each case. This is so be62. For a discussion of the court's ruling on the inference issue see text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
63. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709, 433 P.2d 732, 742, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 734 (1967).
64. The court held that "[the requirement of a community of interest does not
depend on an identical recovery, and the fact that each member of the class must
prove his separate claim to a portion of any recovery by the class is only one factor to
be considered in determining whether a class action is proper. The mere fact that
separate transactions are involved does not of itself preclude a finding of the requisite
community of interest. . . ." 4 Cal. 3d at 809, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
65. The court quoted Hunter v. McKenzie, 197 Cal. 176, 185, 239 P. 1090, 1094
(1925) as follows: "'The fact of reliance upon alleged false representations may be
inferred from the circumstances attending the transaction which oftentimes afford
much stronger and more satisfactory evidence of the inducement which prompted the
party defrauded to enter into the contract than his direct testimony to the same effect."'
4 Cal. 3d at 814, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
66. See, e.g., Hunter v. McKenzie, 197 Cal. 176, 185, 239 P. 1090, 1094 (1925).
67. 12 S. WmLmSTON, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF CoNTzRcrs § 1515, at 480
(3d ed. 1970).
68. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 479, illustration 1, at 914 (1932).
69. "Whether an inference ... or a presumption .. . of reliance arises upon
proof of a material false representation we need not determine in this case. It is
sufficient for our present purposes to hold that if the trial court finds material misrepresentations were made to class members, at least an inference of reliance would
arise as to the entire class." 4 Cal. 3d at 814, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
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cause the nature of the fraud alleged is so extreme that the inference
thus established may well be conclusive against the defendant. Barring
unusual circumstances, it is hard to imagine a member of the class who
did not rely on the representation.
One of the customary aspects of the consumer class action has
been that the individual claims involved are small. In Vasquez, however, the claims were in the $1,300-$1,700 range, and defendants
argued that the amounts involved were large enough to justify individual actions. 70 The court responded to this argument by drawing
an analogy to Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,7 a class action brought
on behalf of minority stockholders protesting the transfer of certain
stock to a holding company for the benefit of the majority stockholders. Although the Jones case concerned sections of the Financial &
Corporations Codes, 72 it also alleged a right to sue on behalf of the
class of minority stockholders under the provisions of section 382 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. 73 Since a class action was involved, and
since the sums in question were "substantially" greater than those involved in Vasquez,74 the court completed the analogy and concluded
that stockholders7 5 as a class were not more entitled to protection than
were consumers.
In summary, Vasquez has placed California in substantial accord
with the federal decisions insofar as class actions are concerned, 76 and
70. Id. at 816, 484 P.2d at 974, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
71. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
72. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 4100-24, 4300, 4304, 4306, 4308, 4310, 4311, 4600-93
(West 1955), as amended, (Supp. 1971); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 5066-69, 5500, 6400

(West 1968).
73. 1 Cal. 3d at 120-21, 460 P.2d at 480, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
74. In Jones, the amount was considerably greater. Plaintiffs asked for damages of $972.50 per share for return of capital, plus interest, exemplary damages, and
fair market value for each share of the holding company's stock. I Cal. 3d at 118,

460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 612. According to the District Court of Appeal, the
fair market value of the holding company's stock was in the vicinity of $9,000. Jones
v. H.F. Ahmanson Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 293, 297 (Ct. App. 1969), vacated, 1 Cal. 3d

93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
75. 4 Cal. 3d at 816, 484 P.2d at 974, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
76. Federal class actions are predicated upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which specifies the customary class size and common question requirements and notes two additional balancing tests through which the court may reach

a decision: (1) whether common issues predominate over issues affecting only individual members of the class, and (2) whether a class action is "superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication" of the matter. These general
principles are apparently applied in both Daar and Vasquez, suggesting that Rule 23

federal decisions will be worthwhile guidelines in California class actions under section
382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Compare Vasquez v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) with Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) and Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 48

February 19721

VASQUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

has applied the class action to one of the central problems of consumer
fraud-that of fraudulent misrepresentation. 77 The case has subtly but
significantly altered the burden of proof at trial, and has, standing
alone, placed the state in the forefront of class action litigation.
Vasquez and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
The Consumers Legal Remedies Act 78 became effective on January 1, 1971." 9 By implication, the legislature specified that the act was
not to be retroactive. 0 Thus, Vasquez was decided against the background of the act, even though the suit, which was filed before the effective date of the act, was not brought within the confines of the act.
One of the act's primary characteristics is that it is a class action
statute, intended to provide specifically for consumer fraud class actions. 8 ' The guidelines for its implementation are similar to those employed by the court in Vasquez. Section 1781(b) provides:
The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all
members of the represented class if all of the following conditions
exist:
(1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before
the court.
(2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the
individual members.
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
(4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Furthermore, a fact situation such as that found in Vasquez seems
to fall under the provisions of section 1770 of the act, which provides:
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction inF.R.D. 7 (N.D. IM. 1969) and Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968) and Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor
Clinton, 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
77. See generally Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does
the Consumer Have a Private Remedy? 1968 Duxn LJ. 831.
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750-56, 1760-61, 1770, 1780-84 (West Supp. 1971).
See note 5 supra.
79. Id. § 1756.
80. One of the drafters of the act wrote: "[g]iven the supplemental nature of
the Act, it goes without saying that litigation commenced before its effective date is
not affected by it." Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAc. LI. 1, 9 (1971).
81. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1781 (West Supp. 1971). This section of the act also
provides for individual actions.
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tended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or
services to any consumer are unlawful:
(g) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or
model, if they are of another.8 2
The Consumers Legal Remedies Act, however, contains certain
limitations which are not applicable to actions brought under Code of
Civil Procedure section 382. Under the act, for example, thirty days
prior to bringing an action the consumer must issue a demand for
rectification of the alleged violations, 83 and no action may be maintained if the seller has made an attempt to identify members of the
similarly situated class,8" has notifed the identified members of the class
that action will be taken on their request for rectification, 5 and has, in
fact, given that remedy or will do so in a "reasonable time."8 6 Moreover, "good faith" is a defense to any action which may be brought under the act, provided that87the seller has employed "reasonable procedures" to avoid such errors.
These provisions stand in possible contrast to section 382 as interpreted in Vasquez. The act is designed to protect the consumer
without harm to the fraudulent seller beyond that which he will incur
from simply repaying amounts already illegally gained from the con88
sumer.
According to an author who participated in the drafting of the
act, 9 the act will safeguard the rights of the consumer. Section 1782
(c)(4) provides that no action may be maintained if the seller can
show that:
82. A "particular standard" could be interpreted as a reasonable asking price for
the freezers, rather than the inflated values at which they were sold. Section 1770(e)
also seems to apply. The wording of that section states that it is unlawful to represent "that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, or qualities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship,
approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he does not have." (emphasis added).
Allegedly, the food packages were to last seven months, and representations were
made that the consumer would save substantially on monthly food budgets.
83. Id. § 1782(a). The demand requirement applies where no request for injunctive relief is sought.
84. Id. § 1782(c)(1).
85.

Id. § 1782(c)(2).

86. Id. § 1782(c)(3).
87. Id. § 1784.
88. In the words of Reed, "[i]t
was recognized that even the most corrupt merchant can exonerate himself under these provisions." Reed, supra note 80, at 17.
The legislature accepted this disadvantage, however, in order to allow passage of the
act.
89. James S. Reed, Chief Counsel, Assembly Judiciary Committee, California
Legislature, 1967-71.
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Such person has ceased from engaging, or if immediate cessation is
impossible or unreasonably expensive under the circumstances,
such person will, within a reasonable time, cease to engage, in such
methods, act or practices. 90
These provisions, of course, are as yet untested. Although Reed
argues that settlement with the named plaintiffs will not prohibit them
from continuing with the action, 1 the act is not clear in that regard,
and "no action may be maintained" if the seller has
made a "good
92
faith" attempt to rectify the harm done to the consumer.
The traditional reluctance of consumers to continue with a class
action after settlement has been offered in their individual case was
illustrated in Vasquez, where two of the individual plaintiffs were unwilling to settle and, on behalf of the other consumers, continued the
suit. If the trial court were to determine, as the defendants claimed
and as could be inferred from the high percentage of potential settlement, that a good faith attempt to settle had been made on behalf of
the seller, the Vasquez case could not have been maintained under the
provisions of the act.
Moreover, since there is no guarantee that a "good faith" attempt
to notify all defrauded members of a particular class will actually result
in their notification,9 3 the seller would be left with gains accumulated
from those defrauded consumers who have not been apprised of their
rights. In an action under section 382, on the other hand, a judgment
is leveled against the seller for the full amount of his fraudulent sales,
thus preventing him from benefiting from his practices.
The provisions of the act are reasonable insofar as they protect
the consumer who complains vociferously to the seller, and threatens a
lawsuit. Those same provisions, however, protect the fraudulent seller
from suit and may, in some circumstances, allow him to retain some of
the profits from his illegal activity.
The ultimate differences between the Consumers Legal Remedies
Act and actions brought under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure remain for later decisions to resolve. It seems clear, however,
that there are at least several distinctions which would cause the consumer to bring an action under section 382, rather than under the act.
The defendants in Vasquez, well aware of these distinctions, ar90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1782(c)(4) (West Supp. 1971).
91. Reed, supra note 80, at 19.
92. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1784 (West Supp. 1971).
93. Under the provisions of section 1781(d), the court may direct either party to
notify the members of the class concerning the action. This provision would doubtless
allow for maximum exposure. Nevertheless, not all actions for consumer fraud entail
large consumer items for which detailed records are kept, and the seller could easily
retain a substantial profit in such a case even after meeting "good faith" notice requirements.
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gued that since the act contained many protective provisions for defendants, no plaintiff would choose to bring suit under the more restrictive provisions of the act if the court allowed a class action for consumer fraud under section 382." Defendants claimed, therefore, that
allowing a class action under the Vasquez facts would render the act
nugatory.
The court found that there was "no merit" in defendant's contention. 5 Their reasoning on this issue, however, is unclear, and it seems
that the court has not taken a clear stand regarding the extent to which
the act is applicable to the general field of consumer fraud.
The court first cited section 1752, where the act stipulates that its
provisions are not exclusive, in support of their conclusion that there is
"a legislative intent not to affect class actions which may be maintained
under other provisions of law."9 6 Since the act does not specifically
provide that its remedies are to be exclusive for the general type of deceptive representations described in section 1770,17 this dicta seems to
clearly imply that the act has been tightly interpreted by the court and
would not apply to future cases similar to Vasquez. Such cases could
be maintained under "other provisions of law" which would include
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted in Vasquez.
The court, however, continued with another statement which creates considerable uncertainty as to their actual intention. The court
carefully discussed the fact that section 1770 was largely confined to
deceptive representations, and pointed out that a case like Daar, where
a taxicab company overcharged because of inflated meter readings,
94. 4 Cal. 3d at 818, 484 P.2d at 975, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
Business
interests succeeded in purging the "unconscionability" language from the act, which also
contributed to the fact that it is inherently weaker than actions brought under the
Code of Civil Procedure. As is true with most legislative enactments, the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act is a product of compromise. This is ideal for a democracy, but
not very ideal for the consumer, whose lobbies are often less organized than those of
business interests. See Reed, supra note 80, at 11.
95. 4 Cal. 3d at 818, 484 P.2d at 975, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
96. Id. at 818, 484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
97. The act does state, in section 1752, that "[cilass actions by consumers

brought under the specific provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing with section 1770)
of this title shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of Chapter 4 (commencing
with section 1780)." Prior to this statement, however, the section is quite explicit in
holding that its remedies are not exclusive. The first portion of the section reads:

"The provisions of this title are not exclusive.

The remedies provided for herein shall

be in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for in any other law.

Nothing in this title shall limit any other statutory or any common law rights of
the Attorney General or any other person to bring class actions." CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1752 (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
The implication seems clear that
Chapter 4 is to govern only if the plaintiff voluntarily brings an action under
Chapter 3. For further discussion of this issue see text accompanying notes 100-01
infra.
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would not come within the confines of the act."" Conspicuous by its
absence, however, was commentary on whether Vasquez would be permitted today under section 382, or whether the same fact situation
would now have to be brought under the more restrictive provisions of
the act. The court does not, in clear terms, meet this issue and, indeed,
conclude their holding on the matter with the statement that "if a class
action is filed after January 1, 1971, the effective date of the act, and
it alleges conduct described in section 1770, the procedures specified
in the act must be utilized." 99
This phrase of the opinion is extremely important, since the court
merely states that a suit must be brought under the act "if it alleges conduct" which is proscribed in the act. Of course, this statement sheds
little light on whether Vasquez would be deemed to come within the
proscriptions specified in the act. Does the court infer that all actions
for consumer fraud must henceforth be brought under the provisions of
the act? If so, the effect of the earlier portions of the Vasquez decision are largely negated. On the other hand, does the court's statement comprise a warning to plaintiff's counsel to carefully avoid alleging specific practices specifically mentioned in the wording of section
1770? If so, such an interpretation would unquestionably restrict the
application of the act and permit full use of section 382 as interpreted
in Vasquez while still allowing recourse to the act should plaintiffs desire to invoke its provisions. This crucial issue will have to await final
adjudication in a subsequent case when plaintiffs allege causes of action which are predicated on deceptive representations, but carefully
avoid any mention of the specific wording of section 1770.
Lending support to the proposition that the act has been expanded
by the court to cover all aspects of consumer fraud which may be reasonably inferred as falling under section 1770 is the court's failure to
specifically cite Vasquez as falling outside the aegis of the act, and
further, the court's refutation of the defendant's claim that no plaintiff
would bring an action under section 1770 if such an action could also
be brought under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the
court has in fact restricted the application of the act, the defendant's
argument applies with some force, and the court's response that the defendant's argument had no merit was really no response at all. Indeed, there would appear to be significant "merit" to the defendant's
contention. It is entirely possible, however, that the court has indicated through dictum that the facts of Vasquez would fall within the
98. 4 Cal. 3d at 818, 484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808. Of course, the
legislature was very much aware of the Daar holding, which does much to explain
why such a fact situation was not included-it already was allowed by laws less restrictive than the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. See Reed, supra note 80, at 14.
99. 4 Cal. 3d at 818, 484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
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act, and as a result, the suit could not be brought under section 382 if it
were repeated today. If this is the court's interpretation, the limitation
is unfortunate. The clear mandate of the legislature is that the act be
interpreted by the courts in the manner most favorable to the consumer.1"' In fact, the act itself provides, in section 1752, that "[t]he
provisions of this title are not exclusive. The remedies provided for
herein shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for in any other law."'' 1
To briefly summarize, the court has not specifically stated that the
act would apply to all consumer fraud class actions, since it merely
stated that the act would apply only if the plaintiffs "allege conduct"
within section 1770. Indeed, since the act was not retroactive, the
court was under no compulsion to even mention it. The sounder view
may be that the court was simply stating that all actions brought which
alleged the specific practices mentioned in the act must be governed
exclusively by the protective procedures of the act. 1 1 2 To the extent
that there may be a choice here between a limitation of the scope of
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and a limitation on the Vasquez
interpretation of section 382, the legislature itself provided the ground
rules: decide in favor of the consumer.10 3 Furthermore, the court,
by restricting the application of the act, would not prevent an individual consumer from seeking redress under its provisions. This
would apply in relation to some practices proscribed under the act, primarily misleading advertising, which are outside the realm of the Vas04
quez decision. 1
The legislature displayed no desire to substitute the act for the current law on consumer class actions.' 05 When the 1970 legislature met,
the Vasquez case was still making its way to the supreme court. It is
extremely questionable that there would have been a Consumers Legal
100. Reed, in discussing section 1760 of the Civil Code, providing for liberal
construction of the act, makes the point very strongly when he writes in reference to
the legislature's policy statement, that "[t]he message is clear-when in doubt, decide
in the consumers' favor." Reed, supra note 80, at 8.
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1752 (West Supp. 1971). For the complete text of the
section see note 97 supra.

102.

Support for this interpretation may be found in the court's statement that

"class actions brought for redress against the specified deceptive practices and filed
hereafter must be governed exclusively by the provisions of the act." 4 Cal. 3d at 819,

484 P.2d at 976, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (emphasis added).
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (West Supp. 1971); see note 100 supra.
104. The list of practices proscribed under section 1770, sixteen in all, includes
the advertising of goods when there is no intention to sell them as advertised, and the
advertising of goods when a reasonable supply is not available, unless a specific quantity

is mentioned in the advertisement. Id. §§ 1770(i), (j).
105. See text at note 97 supra. Nowhere does the act state that it will supercede prior case law.
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Remedies Act had Vasquez been part of the prevailing California law.
It would be ironic indeed if the attempt of the legislature to grant consumers greater latitude of redress in consumer fraud class actions became anachronistic so soon after its passage. Even though Vasquez
does not make clear whether it expands or restricts the act, the latter
seems not only to be the most reasonable interpretation of the decision,
but also that which would be most in accord with the legislative intent
and the rights of the consumer.
Regardless of the view taken as to the court's interpretation of the
act in relation to the general application of the act to consumer fraud
class actions brought under section 382, the generally liberal tenor of
the court's holding in Vasquez gives obvious notice that the act's provisions will be liberally interpreted within the framework of the legislation. This may be important in the still unresolved problem which will
arise in a case in which some of the practices complained of are discussed specifically in section 1770, and some are wholly outside the
terms of the act. A liberal interpretation of the act, as required by
section 1760,106 would seem to indicate that all cases of this dual nature could be brought -under section 382. This, apparently, was the express intent behind the act as promulgated by the legislature. 10 7 Since
the whole purpose of the consumers Legal Remedies Act is to benefit
the consumer, the court should not strain to include cases within the
act which might otherwise be solved under the more liberal doctrine of
Vasquez.
The legislature may have unwittingly established a regrettable barrier in prohibiting the defrauded consumer access to decisional law if
the specific practice is alleged to be within the purview of section 1770
of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. 10 8 The court, on the other
hand, may have intended to rectify this situation by giving the act a restrictive interpretation if plaintiffs plead consumer fraud without mentioning any of the specific practices mentioned in section 1770.
Though this interpretation may well be what the court intended, and is
certainly the view most beneficial to the consumer, the specific determination of this issue was not finalized in Vasquez in clear terms.
Vasquez and the Close Connection Rule
Vasquez involved much more than technical rules regarding which
parties may or may not bring a class action. One of the most pervasive
problems in the consumer fraud field is that the original seller-after
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (West Supp. 1971).
107. See Reed, supra note 80, at 9.
108. The legislature, of course, was operating without any foreknowledge that
remedies for consumer fraud under the rule of Vasquez would soon be available to
the consumer.
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assigning the installment contracts in question to a finance companymay have gone bankrupt, left the area, or otherwise escaped financial
responsibility to the consumer. This, obviously, would give the victorious consumer a Pyrrhic victory if the finance company can effectively claim holder in due course status and thus escape liability. It is
this problem, central to the field, to which the court next turned. The
Vasquez decision expands on what formerly was dicta in Morgan v.
Reasor Corporation"°9 which held that when a close connection existed
between the original seller and the financier, that connection in turn
warranted the establishment of a fictional agency relationship between
the financier and the seller. 110
The "close connection" rule was first espoused in the landmark
case of Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs,"' an Arkansas decision.
There, the court held that "[because] appellant was so closely connected with the entire transaction . . .it cannot be heard to say that
it . . .was an innocent purchaser for value before maturity ...
""'
The close connection rule, in effect, establishes an agency relationship
between the seller and the financier in order to cause the financier to
be an original party to the transaction." 3 Although other courts have
adopted the rule," 4 this interpretation is still the minority position." 5
California, prior to Morgan, had not applied the agency relationship unless there was actual notice of the fraud. In Commercial Credit
Corporation v. Orange County Machine Works," 6 the leading California case, the finance company supplied the vendor with contract
forms, twice consulted with the vendor about the impending deal, knew
all the details of the trasaction in advance, had financed prior sales to
109. 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968).
110. Id. at 895, 447 P.2d at 647-48, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
111. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
112. Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
113. The rationale for this rule is delineated in Jones v. Approved Bancredit
Corp., 256 A.2d 739, 742 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969): "[Tlhe more the holder knows
about the underlying transaction . . . the more he controls or participates in it, the
less he fits the role of the good faith purchaser for value; and the less justification
there is for according to him the protected status of holder in due course ....
114. See, e.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1953);
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers,
74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950); Norman v. World Wide Distribs., Inc.,
202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
In addition to the close connection theory,
similar results in the above cases also employ four other theories-notice, bad faith,
original party, and agency.
115. For a state-by-state survey of judicial positions on the issue see Jones,
Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q.
177, 197-212.
116. 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
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the same firm, and served as the essential moving force behind the
sale.117 The court held that the finance company was deemed an origi-

nal party to the transaction in a very real sense. For the next eighteen
years the requirement in California for the loss of holder in due course
status was actual notice.
The close connection rule espoused in Orange County, however,
8
underwent substantial revision in Morgan v. Reasor Corporation.11
There the court applied Civil Code section 1812.719 to bar a finance

company with "constructive" knowledge 2 ' of violations of the Unruh
Act from recovering finance charges.'
No longer was there a requirement of active participation or actual knowledge. In Morgan the
financier was held liable because there were sufficient warnings of non-

117. Only actual notice would be sufficient, under this rule, to establish the
"original party" or "close connection" relationship required in Commercial Credit.
The Morgan decision states that "[t]o invoke the rule in Commercial Credit the buyer
must show that the seller contemplated that the credit would in fact be advanced by,
and the note in fact held by, the particular financing institution involved, since such
proof would amount to demonstration of ratification of an undisclosed agency." 69
Cal. 2d at 895, 447 P.2d at 647-48, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08. The lack of any additional guidelines to illustrate the financier's intent in this somewhat restrictive view led
the court, in a later dicta portion of the Morgan opinion, to develop the other
factors discussed in note 123 infra.
118. 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968). Morgan was an
action in declaratory relief brought to establish whether the Unruh Act applied to a
lien contract and a promisory note providing for the construction of a house. The
seller assigned the contract within three months to a finance company. The court
held that the act applied to this sort of contract, and prevented the finance company
from collecting the finance charges. The 1969 legislature amended the Unruh Act
to prevent its application to construction contracts, providing that "[tihis act is intended
to abrogate any contrary rule in Morgan v. Reasor Corp." Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 554, § 2,
at 1180; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1801.4 (West Supp. 1971).
119. "In case of failure by any person to comply with the provisions of this
chapter, such person or any person who acquires a contract or installment account
with knowledge of such noncompliance is barred from recovery of any finance charge
. . . imposed in connection with such contract.

. .

and the buyer shall have the right

to recover from such person an amount equal to any of such charges paid by the
buyer." CAL. Cv. CODE § 1812.7 (West Supp. 1971).
120. This requirement will likely be fulfilled in most of the ordinary transactions
which occur. One writer has maintained that "the 'knowledge' requirement for the application of section 1812.7 will be satisfied in the vast majority of consumer sales."
McCall, Commercial Transactions and Consumer Protection, 1970 CAL LAw 443, 469.
For a discussion of the factors which may lead the court to conclude that the seller possesses the intent to transfer the contract to the financier and, also, that the financier
has constructive knowledge sufficient to warrant his identification as the seller's principal see note 123 infra.
121. 69 Cal. 2d at 889, 447 P.2d at 643-44, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04. At the
time of the Morgan decision, the term used was "time-price differential." The phrase
was struck by the 1969 legislature from Civil Code section 1802.10 and the phrase
"finance charge" was substituted.
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compliance with the Unruh Act to put a reasonable man on notice as
to such violations. 122
In a later portion of the opinion, clearly dictum, the court added
another, crucially important, criteria. The fact that the seller "contemplated" that the amount involved would be transferred to the financier was established as a primary test of the financier's liability.
Though this section of the opinion was dictum, the impact it caused on
the Commercial Credit case was substantial. 123 However, the holding
of the court was limited to the finance charges involved and did not involve the liability of the financier under the original contract.
In Vasquez the plaintiffs alleged that the seller had assigned its
installment contracts to the finance companies over a long period of
time, and further, that the majority of the contracts had been assigned
to one of the finance companies which also provided forms to be used
by the food processor. 1 24 Clearly, these allegations were designed to
bring Vasquez under the Commercial Credit rule as interpreted in Morgan.
These distinctions with regard to actual and constructive notice
are built upon the codification of the notice requirement in California
Commercial Code section 3 3 02 ( 1 ) (c) which provides:
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument...
[w]ithout notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against it or claim to it on the part of any person.
Since negotiable instruments are not excluded by this section, even such
an instrument would be inadequate to allow holder in due course status
to be extended to the finance companies under the allegations in Vas12
quez.

5

The contract in Vasquez, moreover, was not an ordinary promisory
note. 12 6 It was merely an installment contract assigned to a finance
122. Id. at 889, 447 P.2d at 643, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
123. Since facts to illustrate the assignor's intent and the assignee's "knowledge"
were not available, the court formulated the following guidelines by which such intent
and knowledge might be deduced in future cases of the same variety: If the financier
has inquired into the buyer's credit rating; if the financier's name appeared on the
note at the time it was executed by the buyer; if the commercial paper was assigned
to the financier on the same day that the transaction took place; or if there have
been a "substantial number" of previous dealings between the seller and the finance
company involved. Id. at 896, 447 P.2d at 648, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 408. One or more
of these circumstances may cause application of the agency principle through the
close connection rule.
124. 4 Cal. 3d at 832 n.21, 484 P.2d at 979 n.21, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 811 n.21.
125. Id. at 822, 484 P.2d at 978, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
126. Id. The primary practical difference between promissory notes, which are
negotiable instruments, and installment contracts, which are not under these circumstances, concerns the defenses which may be employed by the buyer in each case. For
itemization of "real defenses" available against a holder in due course see UNIFORM
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company with whom the seller customarily did business, together with
an invalid clause waiving plaintiff's defenses against assignees. 1 27 In
most transactions of this sort, there is no intent to pass the contract on
after it has been assigned, i.e., it has reached its ultimate destination. 12 8
Even if the documents had not been separately negotiated in Vasquez,
waiver of liability clauses such as those which have been included in the
seller's contract would only be effective if the assignee takes in good
faith and without notice of possible defenses.' 2 9 Thus, if "notice" is defined liberally in a constructive rather than actual sense, financiers are
effectively precluded from establishing holder in due course status unless they can clearly indicate no constructive knowledge. Section 9206
of the Commercial Code, however, does provide a caveat in relation to
the "notice" requirement, and states that30a "different rule" may be es-

tablished for consumer goods purchasers.'

The primary question in Vasquez was whether Civil Code section
1804.2-a portion of the Unruh Act---established a "different rule"

regarding the notice requirement. Under this section:
Except as provided in section 1812.7, an assignee of the seller's
rights is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer against the
seller arising out of the sale notwithstanding an agreement to the
contrary, but the assignee's liability may not exceed the amount of
the debt owing to the assignee at the time that the defense is asserted against the assignee. The rights of the buyer under this
to a claim by
section can only
131 be asserted as a matter of defense
the assignee.

COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(2)(a)-(e). See also Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of
Commercial Paper, 39 S.CAL. L. REv. 48, 62-3 (1966).
127. A waiver-of-defense clause is prohibited by the Unruh Act, CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1804.1(a) (West Supp. 1971). The act also prohibits an execution of any note
by a buyer which will cut off any right of action the buyer has against the seller if
the note is separately negotiated. Id. § 1810.7. California, with these restrictions on
holder in due course status, is one of a growing minority with similar statutory provisions. For a comprehensive survey of the 16 states with such statutes, see Murphy,
Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and
Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 667, 674 n.24 (1968).
128. See Comment, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High
Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs,
14 U.C.L.A.L. Rv.879, 900 n.83 (1967), quoted in Morgan, where the author states
that "[slince neither the seller nor the financing agency normally intends any further
negotiation of the instrument, the general policy behind granting holder in due course
status to a purchaser-to further the free transferability of commercial paper-is not applicable to the typical retail installment sale."
129. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9206 (West 1964).
130. id.§ 9206(1).
131. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1804.2 (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added). Defendants
argued that a reasonable interpretation of section 1804.2 "would be that it is inspired by
the realization of the legislature that whenever a seller commits fraud there are in effect
two victims, the buyer and the finance company. It is a fair attempt to allocate losses,
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The import of the section is apparently to prevent the buyer from bringing an action for rescission against the finance company. The wording
is unfortunate because no reference is made as to whether actual or
constructive notice is required in this regard.
The court in Vasquez interpreted the code section to mean that
the limitations on the buyer's rights asserted in section 1804.2 apply
only to the assignee without notice of any sort. The court stated:
We are constrained to conclude that the limitations on a buyer's
rights set forth in section 1804.2 are not applicable if an assignee
has taken the contract with notice of defenses of the buyer against
the assignor or if the assignee's relationship with
132 the assignor comes
within the rule set forth in Commercial Credit.
This is an extremely important departure from past decisions. The entire contract becomes suspect under Vasquez, not merely the portion
under the control of the assignee. The assignee, under the Vasquez
rule, is deemed to be privy to the original fraud even though the contract for the sale of the goods is quite separate and distinct from the financing.
Several policy reasons were advanced by the court for its decision
to make the finance companies defendants in Vasquez, 133 and the court
pointed out that section 1804.2, which was taken from the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code,'1 4 was not intended to prevent affirmative suits
against the finance company for rescission, but rather to protect the fiagainst large suits for damages in products liabilities
nance 1 3companies
5
cases.
since the consumer can merely quit paying and the sooner he does, the less he has to
pay." Defendant's Response Brief to Brief for William F. McCabe as Amicus Curiae
at 28-29, Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971).
One of the participants in the drafting of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, however, argued that "under the interpretation urged by real parties in interest,
if the buyer had paid in all or a substantial amount of the consideration, the assignee
would be able to take advantage of his seller's fraudulent conduct by keeping the
money paid in and iefusing to bring suit, thereby leaving the buyer with a claim for
fraud that he could not raise." Brief for William F. McCabe as Amicus Curiae at 7-9,
Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
132. 4 Cal. 3d at 824, 484 P.2d at 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
133. The court argued that an act intended to benefit consumers should not be
interpreted in such a manner that they would be treated less beneficially than others
in the commercial arena. In addition, the Unruh Act was to be liberally interpreted
to benefit the consumer. Id. at 824-25, 484 P.2d at 979, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
134. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404, Alternative A. The court noted
that the model code has not been adopted in California.
135. William Warren, a co-reporter-draftsman of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, commented extensively on section 1804.2 in an amicus curiae brief. He wrote
that the section "gives a just result only if the word 'claim' is interpreted to mean a
valid, enforceable claim on the part of the assignee." Brief for William F. McCabe
as Amicus Curiae at 10. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964,
94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). For his general discussion of the section see id. at 7-10.
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Apparently the legislature was unable to imagine a situation in
which stopping the finance company from enforcing its claim would
not be a sufficient safeguard, 1 36 and thus did not provide for it. Vasquez, however, provided just such a situation within months of the
act's passage. Accordingly, the court was forced to stretch the language of section 1804.2-which by its language appeared to preclude
affirmative action
for rescission against the financier-to achieve a
13 7
sound result.
The real basis of the decision against the finance companies was
probably not the contention that the financiers actually have reason to
know of the seller's actions. 138 Rather, the court appeared to be motivated by the fact that if the lender did not take the loss, the buyer would
absorb the entire loss instead. Lending credence to this interpretation
of the court's motivations is their statement that,
[i]n the instant case, as in many situations in which consumers
have been defrauded by a seller, a judgement against the seller alone
would represent a Pyrrhic victory because the defrauding seller is
insolvent and the victorious consumers remain liable to the finance
companies, which as the assignees of the installment contracts
claim that they are entitled to payment even if the seller. acted fraudulently. Obviously, if plaintiffs are to be made whole for the
wrongs allegedly done to them, the finance company defendants
must be held liable as assignees if [the seller] is culpable.13 9
The holding of the court in this matter, whatever the motivation,
makes it incumbent upon the finance company to protect itself.140 The
only apparent alternative is more effective investigation, at least initially, of the sellers with whom the finance company might expect less
136. In Morgan, for example, the finance company stood to lose $7,544.12,
and they were thus fairly certain to bring suit.

69 Cal. 2d 881, 885, 447 P.2d 638,

641, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 401 (1968).
137. The language, at least, is a stretch from the apparent plain language of the
section. If one attributes "fault" to misinterpretation of the provision, it apparently
lies with the drafters of the legislation. For opposing views on the intent of the
section see note 131 supra.
138. Many of the customary contacts between the finance company and the seller
are arguably remote from selling functions, and are much closer to credit functions.
See Note, Consumer Financing, 55 CORNLL L. RaV. 611, 620-22 (1970), for a
viewpoint critical of fusing the two.
139. 4 Cal. 3d at 821-22, 484 P.2d at 978, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (emphasis added).
140. The great majority of consumer installment sales contracts will likely fall
within the rule of Vasquez. Cf. McCall, Commercial Transactions and Consumer
Protection, 1970 CAL LAw 443, 469, where the author states that "[t]he sweep of the

close connection rule as announced by the Court [in Morgan] will obviously include
a vast percentage of all transactions in which a seller transfers notes and accounts
generated by retail installment sales to his financier. . . . Thus, the 'knowledge'
requirement for the application of section 1812.7, will be satisfied in the vast majority
of consumer sales." While the author was discussing Morgan and section 1812.7, the
argument would be just as valid under the facts in Vasquez.
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than honorable dealings. However, as the finance companies take a
more active role in the investigation of the seller, they will inevitably establish a relationship with the seller which will 4 bring them within the
original party agency rule of Commercial Credit.' 1
Thus, caught between the rules of Commercial Credit and Vasquez, the only real alternative available to the finance company is the
effective policing of the fraudulent seller.' 4 2 This will result, no doubt,
in initial difficulties for the financiers and quite possibly in the bankruptcy of several sellers because no one will be willing to buy their installment contracts.' 4 3 For the most part, the costs of financing will increase in porportion to the amount of loss previously suffered by consumers due to their lack of effective redress. If the consumer can win
a suit brought under the Vasquez holding, the finance company will lose
profits only to the extent that the consumer previously suffered a loss."'
To the extent that general costs will rise because the financiers must
now investigate all sellers, it is preferable to add such small costs to the
contract than to ask the particular defrauded consumer to suffer the
entire loss. 145
Clearly, finance companies would be less willing to purchase the
contracts of sellers likely to cause them loss. This would imply that
the first casualties under the more discriminating financing policies
would be the seller likely to be fraudulent. Hopefully, the result of
forcing the financing companies to be thus discriminating would be the
eventual elimination of fraudulent sellers. In the meantime, it seems
far more advisable to place the risk
of loss on the finance company
46
rather than on the innocent buyer.
Thus, contrary to the court's statement, 47 the question of whether
lenders who purchase installment contracts should be deemed holders
in due course is considered by the court and is resolved against the lenders, simply by holding that all lenders in the typical installment con141.

This, in fact, was the very contention of the finance companies in Vasquez.

4 Cal. 3d at 824, 484 P.2d at 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
142. The finance company is probably in the best position to accomplish this
policing. See Comment, supra note 128 at 900 n.83 (1967) where the relationship is
explained as follows: "Although the purchases of consumer paper may be isolated
transactions, they are normally carried on under an agreement between the finance
company and the seller providing for many such sales. . . . To the extent that the
finance company has a close connection with the seller, it is in a better position to
discover and police the legality of the seller's contract with the buyer."
143. Alternately, the prices charged by the sellers involved will rise so drastically
because of the increased financing costs that no one will patronize them.
144. Accord, Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Sup. Ct. Fla.
1953).

145. See 4 Cal. 3d at 825, 484 P.2d at 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
146.
147.

Id. at 825, 484 P.2d at 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
Id. at 825 n.24, 484 P.2d at 980 n.24, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812 n.24.
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tract purchase have constructive notice of the fraud and are therefore
not holders in due course. Since the companies cannot disassociate
148 fithemselves without radical alterations in their business patterns,
nance companies are in effect denied the opportunity to claim holder
in due course status. 149
Conclusion
The Vasquez decision deals with many aspects of the consumer
fraud problem, and takes what may be generally considered a liberal
position.
The court, in construing section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to allow consumer class actions for fraud, has taken significant steps to
broaden the class action rule in California. For the first time, it allowed an action for consumer fraud to proceed as a class action, significantly expanding on the rule in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.-previously the leading case. Furthermore, they have made an important
alteration in the burden of proof at trial, by establishing an inference
that common representations will be deemed to have been made to all
members of the class. No longer will individual plaintiffs be required
to testify on the specific representations of the seller, if the court is satisfied that the representations were in fact common to all. As a development in the California law of class actions, Vasquez is a large step
forward. California is now in line with federal decisions under rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is the leading state in
the nation in the area of consumer litigation through the class action.
Bowing to consumer pressure, and without a court decision on
consumer class actions, the legislature enacted the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act in 1970. By itself, the act may well have been a valuable
guideline towards the intent of the legislature in the area of consumer
protection. The court, however, was unclear in its holding as to
whether the facts of Vasquez are included within the provisions of the
act. Presumably, they could be, but the court may have served notice
that unless specific allegations at the pleading level include references
to the act, the court will allow the action to be brought under the Vasquez rule. Given the liberal scope of the opinion, it seems reasonable
to believe that the court may in the future exclude many fact situations
from the act's operation, particularly if the safeguards built into it do
not have their intended effect, and instead impede effective consumer
relief.
148. This is not to say, however, that such alternations are not possible. See
Murphy, supra note 127, at 686. See generally Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence,
39 U. COLO. L. Rav. 461 (1967).
149. This is so because financiers will find it extremely difficult to attain assignee status under the Vasquez decision, and this will effectively foreclose the possibility of holder in due course status.
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Echoing this interpretation, the court expanded the definition of
the close connection rule to include actions for rescission of the original
contract. As such, this expansion, coupled with the rule in Morgan
v. Reasor Corp. means that a fictional agency relationship may be
established in nearly all arrangements between the seller and purchaser of consumer installment contracts. Although the court has been
reluctant to discuss the question of holder in due course status for purchasers of installment contracts, expanded definition by the court has
the same practical effect as denying such status to the financiers. This
is a sound judgment, though it will obviously result in some hardship
to finance companies.
Eventually, the courts must make a decision on the allocation of
loss caused by a fraudulent seller. California has joined the ranks of
those minority states, in what hopefully will be an emerging view, who
hold that the finance company is more fiscally able to bear the loss than
is the consumer. Moreover, the benefits may expand beyond such a
negative justification if the finance companies are forced to protect
themselves by more efficient investigation, with the resultant decrease
in the number of fraudulent sellers.
In summary, the Vasquez decision is a significant step forward in
the California view of the class action and the limitation of the holder
in due course doctrine for the benefit of the consumer. Hopefully, this
decision will clear the way for effective consumer litigation on behalf of
the defrauded purchaser too poor to afford individual recoveries. In
that respect, by liberalizing further the rules governing class actions in
consumer fraud cases, the decision will have indirectly contributed to a
marked decrease in the number of fraudulent sellers operating in California and will perhaps stimulate similar action by other jurisdictions.
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